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I Comments

I

Chronic Nuisance Ordinances: Turning
Victims of Domestic Violence into
"Nuisances" in the Eyes of Municipalities
Amanda K. Gavin*
ABSTRACT

Chronic nuisance ordinances are municipal ordinances that identify
and terminate unwanted "nuisance" activities.
Although chronic
nuisance ordinances originally targeted households that harbored prolific
drug use, many municipalities have broadened the scope of their
ordinances to include a wide range of activities, including acts of
domestic violence. As a result, domestic violence victims are now
frequently deemed "nuisances" when they call the police for protection.
Municipalities, to abate the "nuisances," evict the domestic violence
victims from their homes. Because chronic nuisance ordinances are
gaining in popularity throughout the country, an increasing number of
domestic violence victims are being victimized twice: once by their
abusers and again by their municipalities.
This Comment explores the objectives, validity, and effects of
chronic nuisance ordinances. This Comment also analyzes several
arguments that have been used to challenge the constitutionality of these
*J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University,
2015.
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ordinances. Ultimately, this Comment recommends that municipalities
avoid chronic nuisance ordinances entirely, but in the alternative,
recommends several strategies for limiting the ordinances' harmful
effects.
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INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2012, Lakisha Briggs1 and her three-year-old
daughter faced homelessness at the hands of their municipality.2 At the
time, Lakisha and her daughter lived in a rental house in Norristown,
Pennsylvania, with Lakisha's boyfriend, Wilbert Bennet.3 Norristown,
like many towns in the United States, had adopted a chronic nuisance
ordinance 4 that monitored how many times the police responded to calls
1. Lakisha Briggs is the plaintiff in Briggs v. Borough of Norristown. See Briggs v.
Borough of Norristown, No. 2:13-cv-02191-ER *E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 29, 2013). In
Briggs, Lakisha is suing for injunctive and declaratory relief on the grounds that
Norristown's chronic nuisance ordinances, both the current and previous versions, are
unconstitutional. Id. The law firm of Pepper Hamilton, LLP and the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) filed the complaint on behalf of Ms. Briggs. Id.
2. See Erik Eckholm, Victims' Dilemma: 911 Calls Can Bring Eviction, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2013, http://nyti.ms/l esZ7mW.
3. Id.
4. See Emily Werth, The Cost of Being "Crime Free": Legal and Practical
Consequences of Crime Free Rental Housing and Nuisance Property Ordinances 1, 4
(Aug. 2013), available at http://povertylaw.org/sites/default/files/files/housingjustice/cost-of-being-crime-free.pdf. Chronic nuisance ordinances are a type of third-
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regarding the same property within a set time period. 5 If the police
responded to three calls involving the same property within a four-month
period, then the police could unilaterally evict the tenant from the
property, thus abating the nuisance. 6
Sadly, as a victim of domestic violence, Lakisha frequently needed
to call the police for protection from Wilbert. 7 From January 2012 to
May 2012, Lakisha called the police to her home ten times. 8 On May 23
of the same year, Norristown officials issued a formal letter notifying
Lakisha that if she called the police again, the police would enforce the
chronic nuisance ordinance against her, and she would be evicted. 9
Afraid of becoming homeless, Lakisha managed to end the abusive
relationship, and Wilbert moved out of the residence. ° Nevertheless,
Wilbert would not stay away. "I Instead, when Wilbert once again
attacked Lakisha, Lakisha confronted a difficult decision: call the police
for protection and face imminent eviction or face the abuse without
police protection.' 2 Lakisha chose to face the abuse.1 3 As a result, her
ex-boyfriend struck Lakisha across the face with an ashtray before
stabbing her in the neck with one of the fractured pieces. 14 As she was

party policing program. Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban
Poor: Consequences of Third-Party Policingfor Inner-City Women, 78 AM. Soc. REV.
117, 119-20 (2012) [hereinafter Desmond & Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor].
Third-party policing programs attempt "to control or prevent crime and disorder by
activating non-offending persons who are thought to influence environments where
offenses have occurred or may occur." Id. at 118. Police have reasoned that assigning
police duties to civilians is appropriate because: (1) civilians can help prevent crimes
from occurring and (2) some civilians are responsible for committing the crimes. Id. at
119. Thus, ordinances have started to impose "gatekeeper liability" "'on parties who,
although not the primary authors and beneficiaries of misconduct, might nonetheless be
able to prevent it."' Id. (quoting Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a
Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986)). Chronic
nuisance ordinances should not be confused with other types of third-party policing
programs, such as crime free programs, which, although similarly detrimental to victims
of domestic violence, are not discussed in this Comment. See id. at 117-19. For an
overview of crime free programs, see generally Crime Free Programs, INTERNATIONAL
CRIME FREE ASSOCIATION, http://www.crime-free-association.org.

5. Anne Stolley Persky, A CallforHelp, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2013, at 14-15.
6. Id. at 15.
7. Eckholm, supra note 2.
8. Id.
9. Verified First Amended Complaint at
84-86, Briggs v. Borough of
Norristown, No. 2:13-cv-02191-ER (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Pl.'s First
Am. Compl.].
10. Eckholm, supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Renters Fear Eviction Over 911 Calls, Pennsylvania Lawsuit Says, Fox NEWS
(Sept. 1, 2013), http://fxn.ws/15iJPxN [hereinafter Renters FearEviction].
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losing consciousness, Lakisha begged her neighbor to not call 9-1-1.15
Luckily the neighbor did, and Lakisha survived after being flown by
helicopter to a hospital for treatment. 16 Just as the Norristown officials
warned, however, city officials
initiated eviction proceedings against
17
later.
days
few
a
Lakisha
Unfortunately, Lakisha's story is not unique. Domestic violence is
a nationwide problem that crosses racial, ethnic, economic, age, and
gender lines' 8 and affects approximately 1.4 million people every year.' 9
Additionally, on any given day, over 3000 people face homelessness
because they are unable to find shelter away from their abusers,2° making
domestic violence a leading cause of homelessness in the United States.'
Despite these known facts, municipalities have exacerbated the
housing crisis plaguing domestic violence victims by enacting chronic
nuisance ordinances, which aim to identify and abate any "nuisance"
activity that repeatedly occurs on a property.22 Although chronic
nuisance ordinances originally targeted households that harbored prolific
drug use, many municipalities have broadened the scope of their
ordinances. 23 Now, many different types of activities may constitute
nuisance activities, including acts of domestic violence.24 As a result,
domestic violence victims across the country are being forced to make
the same choice that Lakisha was forced to make: report abuse and face
homelessness or continue to suffer from abuse. In effect, chronic
nuisance ordinances have "turn[ed] victims of crime who are pleading
for emergency assistance into 'nuisances' in the eyes of
[municipalities]."25

This Comment will argue that municipalities should stop adopting
chronic nuisance ordinances or at least include exceptions for victims of
domestic violence. Part II will explain what a chronic nuisance
ordinance is, why a municipality would adopt one, and whether these
15. Eckholm, supra note 2.
16. Id.
17. Id. Lakisha stated that she "felt like [she] was being punished for being
assaulted." Renters FearEviction, supra note 14.
18. See COLO. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERV., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROGRAM 2009
ANNUAL REPORT 1, 2 (2009).

19. Domestic Violence and Homelessness, NAT'L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, July
2009, availableat http://bit.ly/l m9McjT.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. See Werth, supra note 4, at 4 (defining "chronic nuisance ordinance"). Although
the exact number is unknown, "hundreds" of chronic nuisance ordinances are believed to
be in existence. Eckholm, supra note 2.
23. See Eckholm, supra note 2.
24. See id.
25. Id.
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ordinances accomplish their identified goals. Part III will examine the
two chronic nuisance ordinances at issue in Briggs v. Borough of
Norristown,26 the lawsuit initiated by Lakisha Briggs. Part IV will
analyze several arguments challenging the constitutionality of chronic
nuisance ordinances. Finally, Part V will recommend that municipalities
avoid chronic nuisance ordinances entirely, but in the alternative, will
recommend several strategies for limiting the ordinances' harmful effects
for municipalities that insist on adopting one.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

What is a Chronic Nuisance Ordinance?

A chronic nuisance ordinance is a municipal ordinance that
identifies activity the community deems a "nuisance. 2 7 The ordinance
also establishes a nuisance abatement procedure to terminate the
nuisance.28 Nuisance abatement procedures force the owners on whose
properties these activities repeatedly occur to stop such activities or face
penalties.29
Many variations of these ordinances exist. For example, the scope
of a chronic nuisance ordinance differs in each jurisdiction.3" Some
municipalities apply their chronic nuisance ordinance to rental properties
only, some to all residential properties, and yet others to commercial
properties as well as residential properties.31
In addition to the scope of the ordinances, the prohibited activities
also vary.32 Activities that are deemed nuisances range from criminal
activity to lesser, municipal offenses, such as creating loud noises, not
cutting the grass, and having garbage on the property. 3 The list of
prohibited activities, however, is typically very broad.34 Some chronic
nuisance ordinances even contain seemingly limitless catch-all
provisions that can apply to almost any activity.35 Victims of domestic
violence, like Lakisha, often fall into the widely used nuisance activity of

26. Briggs v. Borough of Norristown, No. 2:13-cv-02191-ER (E.D. Pa. filed Apr.
29, 2013).
27. See Werth, supra note 4, at 4 (defining "chronic nuisance ordinance").
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 1 n.2.
31. Id.
32. Werth, supra note 4, at 17.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Id.
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"disorderly conduct," although some ordinances reach domestic violence
victims directly by prohibiting "sexual abuse" and "stalking. 3 6
Chronic nuisance ordinances also vary as to whether residents are
responsible for their own conduct only or others' conduct as well.37
Typically, chronic nuisance ordinances keep track of nuisance activities
38
In
that occur on the property, regardless of who the perpetrator is.
other words, a nuisance activity may be committed by the tenant, a guest,
or a passerby.39 Some chronic nuisance ordinances even create "buffer
zones," meaning that nuisance activities may not occur on the premises
40
or within a defined area surrounding the premises.
Consequently,
tenants and residents may be penalized for nuisance4 1activities that others
commit on the outskirts of their own property lines.

Another variation among chronic nuisance ordinances is the number
of times 4 a2 nuisance activity may occur before it is considered
"chronic.,
Chronic nuisance ordinances tend to focus on excessive
nuisance activities, not a one-time or isolated instance of nuisance
activity. 43 The vast majority of these ordinances define a "chronic"
nuisance as a property that generates a certain number of 9-1-1 calls
within a set period of time, with each call to the police constituting a
"strike." 4 4 After too many strikes accrue, the nuisance activity is viewed
as excessive.45 Many chronic nuisance ordinances deem three strikes
within 90 days as excessive 46 while other ordinances use a 6-month or

36.

JAMES FRANK ET AL., CHRONIC NUISANCE EVALUATION i, 12-13 (2010).

37. See Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor:
Consequences of Third-Party Policingfor Inner-City Women, 78 AM. Soc. REV. 1,4
[hereinafter Desmond & Valdez, Online Supp.] (Online Supp. 2013) (explaining that
Phoenix's chronic nuisance ordinance holds residents responsible for their own conduct
only while Philadelphia's chronic nuisance ordinance holds property owners responsible
for the actions of anyone who comes onto the property).
38. Werth, supra note 4, at 12.
39. Id.
40. FRANK, supra note 36, at 18-19.
41. Id.
42. See Desmond & Valdez, Online Supp., supra note 37, at 4, 6 (explaining that
Chicago's chronic nuisance ordinance requires three or more instances of nuisance
activity within ninety days while Denver's chronic nuisance ordinance requires two
instances of nuisance activity within six months).
43. See FRANK, supra note 36, at 16.
44. See Werth, supra note 4, at 4. "After [9-1-1] became citizens' primary source of
communication with the police, the volume of calls departments received quickly
outpaced their capacity to handle them. Inundated with calls, police departments began
devising strategies to screen out [certain] requests. One such strategy was to rely on
chronic nuisance ordinances." Desmond and Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor,supra
note 4, at 119.
45. FRANK, supra note 36, at 16.
46. See Desmond & Valdez, Online Supp., supra note 37, at 4-18.
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12-month time period.47 When determining whether a property has
reached the nuisance activity limit, most municipalities consider only the
number of incidents reported to the police without filtering the list in any
way.48 Other municipalities require that the police perform some type of
enforcement action, such as issue a warning or citation to verify that a
nuisance
activity did in fact occur, before counting the incident as a
49
strike.
Finally, the nuisance abatement procedures established by chronic
nuisance ordinances also differ. Once a property is deemed a "chronic
nuisance," the landlord or homeowner is required to complete a nuisance
abatement procedure.5 ° Some nuisance abatement procedures explicitly
Other
require the landlord to evict the nuisance-causing tenant.51
for
the
landlord
fines
against
of
escalating
procedures impose a series
each day the tenant remains on the property, in effect compelling the
landlord to evict the tenant.52 In addition to removing the tenant, some
property owners may be required to attend a training class or a public
hearing to comply with a nuisance abatement procedure. 3 If the owner
does not complete the nuisance abatement procedure, the municipality
imposes penalties against the owner.54 The penalties, depending on the
jurisdiction, range from revoked rental licenses 55 to liens being placed on
Once the
the property, property forfeitures, and incarceration. 56
nuisance-causing tenant is removed and the nuisance abatement
procedure is completed, the purpose of the chronic nuisance ordinance is
considered fulfilled.57
B.

The Purpose and Validity of ChronicNuisance Ordinances

Municipalities may adopt a chronic nuisance ordinance for several
reasons. Most municipalities believe a chronic nuisance ordinance will
reduce the demand on law enforcement resources,5 8 address repetitive

47. See id. For example, Baltimore, Maryland's chronic nuisance ordinance defines
excessive as two or more strikes within a two-year time period. Id.
48. FRANK, supra note 36, at 21.
49. Id.
50. Werth, supra note 4, at 4.
51. See Desmond & Valdez, Online Supp., supra note 37, at 2.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See Werth, supra note 4, at 4.
55. Desmond & Valdez, Online Supp., supra note 37, at 2.
56. See Desmond & Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor,supra note 4, at 120.
57. See Werth, supra note 4, at 4.
58. Heather K. Way et al., Building Hope: Tools for Transforming Abandoned and
Blighted Properties into Community Assets 1, 3 (Dec. 2007), available at
https://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/community/buildersofhope.pdf.
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problem behaviors, 59 and recoup the cost of the government's police
response. 60 Municipalities also believe that evicting problem-causing
residents will force the residents to leave the area, resulting in an
increase in surrounding property values and tax revenues. 61 Chronic
nuisance ordinances are particularly popular in today's economy because
they delegate the responsibilities of the police force to property owners at
little cost to municipalities. 62
Chronic nuisance ordinances have existed for at least two decades,
yet very little is known about how effective the ordinances are at
achieving their goals.63 Cincinnati is one of the few cities in the country
with a chronic nuisance ordinance to report a decrease in overall
nuisance activity. 64 The city "reported a ten percent drop in nuisance
related calls.., in just one year.. . and a 22 [percent] overall reduction
from 2006 to 2010.,,65 It is unknown, however, whether this reported
reduction in nuisance related calls was caused by fewer occurrences of
nuisance activity or other factors, such as citizens choosing not to report
such activities for fear of receiving a strike or being evicted.66
The long-term effects of chronic nuisance ordinances are also
unknown. Critics of chronic nuisance ordinances believe the ordinances
may cause harm to communities.67 If Cincinnati's reduction in nuisance
related calls is attributable to citizens being discouraged from calling the
police, then the city's ordinance served only to mask the crimes and
nuisance activities that did occur.68 Thus, the statistical decrease in
nuisance activity would be directly attributable to a decrease in crime
reporting, not a decrease in overall nuisance activity. 69 Furthermore, the
chronic nuisance ordinance may have undermined public safety. 70 When
citizens are discouraged from calling the police, perpetrators are free to
continue committing crimes and other nuisance activities without fear of
59.

See FRANK, supra note 36, at 15.

60.

See id. at 28, 34.

61. Way et al., supra note 58, at 3. Chronic nuisance ordinances developed
concurrently with the rise of environmental criminology. FRANK, supra note 36, at 2.
Environmental criminology is based on the idea that certain characteristics of a place and
"its place managers and guardians, may cause crime to cluster at that location .... [For
example, when] one 'broken window' ... attracts other forms of petty offending that will
eventually build into greater criminal activity and a general decrease in community
quality of life." Id.
62. See FRANK, supra note 36, at 2.

63.

Id.at i.

64.

Id. at 37.

65.
66.

Id.
Id.

67.
68.

See Werth, supra note 4, at 5-12.
See id. at 2, 8.

69.
70.

Id.
Id.
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punishment.7" Perpetrators may even escalate or increase the frequency
of their crimes due to the lack of police response, placing citizens at
greater risk than if there was no chronic nuisance ordinance at all. 72
Critics also argue that chronic nuisance ordinances may increase,
not decrease, costs for municipalities.73 By punishing landlords for the
behavior of tenants, chronic nuisance ordinances discourage landlords
from providing rental housing. The supply of rental housing is further
reduced if chronic nuisance ordinances penalize landlords by revoking
their rental licenses.75 Critics opine that the resulting lack of housing
leads to an increase in homelessness, which in turn causes an increased
burden on municipalities to pay for the medical treatment, shelter, and
other needs of the homeless. 76 Therefore, while chronic nuisance
ordinances may appear to save costs by decreasing calls for emergency
services, the amount saved may in fact be negated or even exceeded by
the costs incurred from the increased homelessness also caused by the
ordinances. 77 Finally, some critics believe that chronic nuisance
ordinances merely shuffle problems elsewhere instead of addressing the
underlying issues, negating any costs saved in one region by increasing
the costs of another region.78
Because so little is known about the long-term effects of chronic
nuisance ordinances, more inquiries and studies are needed. Despite
their vast use, "the proliferation of [chronic nuisance ordinances] ... is
matched only by the paucity of inquiries into [their] ramifications., 79 At
this time, the impact a chronic nuisance ordinance may have on a
community, whether beneficial or detrimental, is unknown. Possibly,
however, these ordinances cause more problems than they solve.
Municipalities, therefore, should pause before adopting a chronic
nuisance ordinance and not rush to the conclusion that such an ordinance
will "serve as a panacea for [all of] their ... ailments. 8 °

71. Id.
72. See Werth, supra note 4, at 2, 8.
73. See Eckholm, supra note 2.
74. See Werth, supra note 4, at 5.
75. Id.
76. See Cost of Homelessness, NATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS,
http://www.endhomelessness.org/pages/cost-of
homelessness (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
77. Eckholm, supra note 2. Additionally, chronic nuisance ordinances may hurt
municipalities' budgets by causing an increase in property abandonment. Way et al.,
supra note 58, at 26-27. Property abandonment decreases property values and paves the
way for more nuisance activities, such as vandalism, to occur. Id.
78. See Eckholm, supra note 2.
79. Desmond & Valdez, Unpolicingthe Urban Poor,supra note 4, at 120.
80. FRANK, supra note 36, at i.
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C. The Effects of Chronic Nuisance Ordinances on Victims of Domestic
Violence
Despite chronic nuisance ordinances' unknown effects, it is known
that these ordinances have a detrimental impact on victims of domestic
violence. 8' Many domestic violence victims, like Lakisha Briggs, must
call for police protection on multiple occasions over a fairly short period
of time.82 Accordingly, chronic nuisance ordinances disproportionately
put domestic violence victims at risk for eviction, particularly when the
ordinances define as excessive two or three calls to the police within a
six-month period of time or longer. 83
Several studies have provided empirical support for the detrimental
impact chronic nuisance ordinances have on victims of domestic
violence. 84 One study, for example, analyzed every nuisance property
citation the Milwaukee Police Department issued over a two-year
period. 85 The study showed that nearly one-third of all tenants evicted
by the city's chronic nuisance ordinance were victims of domestic
violence.86 The Milwaukee ordinance terminated nuisances by fining
landlords each day the tenant remained on the property. 87 As a result,
most of the landlords in the study believed they had no choice but to
evict their tenants. 88 Many landlords even took affirmative steps to
discourage their tenants from calling the police. 89 One landlord told the
Milwaukee Police Department that "[w]e suggested she obtain a gun and
kill him in self-defense, but evidently she hasn't... [so] we are evicting
her." 90 The evicted tenant thus felt that she was being punished for not
committing murder. 91
The detrimental impact of chronic nuisance ordinances on domestic
violence victims is not limited to Milwaukee. 92 The Director of the
Illinois Domestic Violence Helpline stated that every month the helpline
receives multiple calls from women who, like Lakisha Briggs, must
choose between safety and housing. 93 Therefore, the problems that
81. See Werth, supra note 4, at 8-12.
82. See Letter from ACLU to U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. (Sept. 17, 2013),
http://bit.ly/NKYIr6.
83. See id.
84. See Desmond & Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor,supra note 4, at 118, 122.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id.at 122.
88. Id. at 131.
89. See Desmond & Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor,supra note 4, at 122.
90. See id. at 135.
91. See id.
92. See Eckholm, supra note 2.
93. Id.
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chronic nuisance ordinances cause victims of domestic violence are not
theoretical
or rare but routinely occur when such ordinances are
94
enacted.
Chronic nuisance ordinances also encourage abusers to continue
abusing their victims and to escalate their violence. 95 Because abusers
know that their victims are unwilling to call the police out of fear of96
being evicted, abusers have little motivation to control their conduct.
Consequently, abusers are able to continue their abuse without fear of
repercussions from the police. 97
Finally, chronic nuisance ordinances place the burden of stopping
the abuse on the domestic violence victims themselves. 98 In other words,
the responsibility is on the victims at all times to prevent any instance of
abuse from occurring, a seemingly insurmountable burden. 99
Furthermore, because domestic violence victims often do not live with
their abusers, it is the victims who are punished when chronic nuisance
ordinances are enforced, not the abusers.00
Chronic nuisance
ordinances, therefore, turn acts of domestic violence into "nuisances"
and blame the victims for criminal activity committed against them. 1O
III. THE CHRONIC NUISANCE ORDINANCES

AT ISSUE IN BRIGGS V.

BOROUGH OFNORRISTOWN

Two different chronic nuisance ordinances are at issue in Briggs v.
Borough of Norristown:
the Old Ordinance10 2 and the New
10 3
Ordinance.
Norristown enforced the Old Ordinance, the
municipality's original chronic nuisance ordinance, against Lakisha
Briggs after she was attacked by Wilbert Bennet and airlifted to the
hospital. 0 4 Norristown repealed the Old Ordinance, however, after the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 10 5 accepted Lakisha's case for
representation and wrote a letter to the municipality, explaining how the

94. See id.
95. Desmond & Valdez, Unpolicingthe Urban Poor,supra note 4, at 138.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 134.
99. See Persky, supra note 5, at 18.
100. Desmond & Valdez, Unpolicingthe Urban Poor,supra note 4, at 134.
101. Eckholm, supra note 2.
102. NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE § 245-3 (repealed 2012).
103. Norristown, Pa., Ordinance No. 12-15 (Dec. 4, 2012).
104. Pl.'s First Am. Compl.
8, 13-14.
105. The ACLU is a non-profit organization whose mission is to "defend and preserve
the individual rights and liberties that the [U.S.] Constitution ... guarantee[s] everyone in
[the United States]."
About the ACLU, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/about-aclu-0 (last visited July 27, 2014).
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ordinance violated Lakisha's constitutional rights. 10 6 Less than two
weeks later, Norristown enacted the New Ordinance, which is still in
effect today.' 07
A.

Norristown's Old Ordinance

The Old Ordinance is an older, more traditional example of a
chronic nuisance ordinance. 10 8 The Old Ordinance defined a "chronic
nuisance" as any property that hosted a designated nuisance activity
necessitating a police response three or more times within a four-month
period.'0 9 The ordinance designated "disorderly behavior" as a nuisance
activity l0 and defined it as "activity that can be characterized as
disorderly in nature."' 1 The ordinance also expressly included an
instance of domestic violence as an example of a disorderly behavior
incident. 112
Under the Old Ordinance, the police could forcibly evict all tenants
113
from the property once a property was deemed a chronic nuisance.
to
Additionally, the Old Ordinance granted sole discretion of whether 114
enforce the ordinance in an individual case to the Chief of Police.
Likewise, most early versions of chronic nuisance ordinances authorized
the police to perform
evictions and granted broad discretionary powers to
115
the police force.
B.

Norristown's New Ordinance

The New Ordinance is a modem and more typical example of a
chronic nuisance ordinance." 16 Although the New Ordinance shares

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Pl.'s First Am. Compl. 7 8, 12-14.
13-14.
Id.
See Desmond & Valdez, Online Supp., supra note 37, at 4-18.
See Pl.'s First Am. Compl. T 4.
See id. 5.
Id.T5.

112. Id.
113. See id. 4.
114. See Pl.'s First Am. Compl. 6.
115. See Desmond & Valdez, Online Supp., supra note 37, at 4-18.
116. See id.The New Ordinance reads:
It shall be the licensee's responsibility to assure that the tenants, the tenants'
family members, and guests of any tenant or tenant's family member not
engage in disorderly behavior in the rental dwelling unit .... For purposes of
this [section] only, "disorderly behavior" may include, but is not limited to[:] .
. .[any call to a rental dwelling unit or units to which the Norristown Police
Department responds and which, in the sole discretion of the Chief of Police,
involves criminal activity that can be characterized as disorderly in nature,
including, but not limited to, the following types of activity: (1) disorderly
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many similarities with the Old Ordinance, one main difference exists.17
In the New Ordinance, instead of the police suspending and revoking
rental licenses and forcibly evicting tenants, the municipality imposes a
series of escalating criminal fines against the landlords of properties
deemed chronic nuisances.11 8 Consequently, the municipality is
compelling landlords to evict tenants and no longer carries out actual
evictions through its own agents.
Municipal legislators believe that this transfer of eviction authority
from governmental agencies to private entities protects chronic nuisance
ordinances from constitutional challenges.1 9 Accordingly, Norristown
repealed its Old Ordinance and enacted the New Ordinance to withstand
constitutional scrutiny after the ACLU commenced representation of
Lakisha. 120 Despite this change, the ACLU continues to assert that the
New Ordinance violates citizens' constitutional rights and should be
struck down by courts.' 2' Whether such constitutional challenges will
succeed, however, remains uncertain.
IV. ARE CHRONIC NUISANCE ORDINANCES CONSTITUTIONAL?
Although many lawsuits have challenged chronic nuisance
ordinances, most cases have settled before a final judgment could be
23
rendered, 122 and no case has appeared before a court of final appeal. 1
Using Briggs v. Borough of Norristown as an example, 124 this Comment
will analyze several arguments 125 attacking the constitutionality of
chronic nuisance ordinances. 126 The arguments will then be applied to
chronic nuisance ordinances generally,
conduct; . . . [and] (5) domestic disturbances that do not require that a
mandatory arrest be made ....
Norristown, Pa., Ordinance No. 12-15 (Dec. 4, 2012).
117. See Pl.'s First Am. Compl.
14, 16.
118. See id.
119. Seeid. 12-13.
120. See id.
121. See id. 17.
122. See Grape v. Town/Village of East Rochester, No. 07-CV-6075-CJS-(F)
(W.D.N.Y. July 6, 2007).
123. Cari Fais, Denying Access to Justice: The Cost of Applying Chronic Nuisance
Laws to Domestic Violence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1181, 1205 (2008).
124. The ACLU, on behalf of Lakisha Briggs, raised the arguments that are the focus
of this Comment in Briggs v. Borough of Norristown. See Briggs v. Borough of
Norristown, No. 2:13-cv-02191-ER (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 29, 2013).
125. Although not discussed in this Comment, other constitutional arguments include
that chronic nuisance ordinances violate the First Amendment right to petition the
government as well as the Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive due process,
procedural due process, and equal protection. Fais, supra note 123, at 1218-22.
126. Although not discussed in this Comment, the main statutory challenges raised
against chronic nuisance ordinances are that such ordinances violate: (1) the Fair
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Do Chronic Nuisance Ordinances Violate the Void for Vagueness
Doctrine?

In Briggs, the ACLU argues that the New Ordinance127 should be
declared unconstitutional due to the void for vagueness doctrine.' 28 The
void for vagueness doctrine is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. 129 The doctrine is defined as "establishing a
requirement or punishment without specifying what is required or what
conduct is punishable, and therefore void because violative of due
process."' 130 The U.S. Supreme Court has developed a two-pronged test
for determining if a statute is unduly vague. 131 The first prong of the test
examines whether the statute "provide[s] a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what [conduct] is prohibited."' 132 The second
prong of the test analyzes whether the statute provides a standard so that

Housing Act and (2) the Violence Against Women Act. Id. at 1206-17. For a discussion
of these statutory challenges, see Fais, supra note 123, at 1206-17. Many states have
also adopted public policies that aim to protect victims of domestic violence by
increasing the available legal protections for these particular victims. See Ana S. Salper,
Legal Protectionsfor Victims of Domestic Violence on the Rise, Aug. 14, 2013, available
Therefore, enforcing chronic nuisance ordinances against
at http://bit.ly/leVevxe.
domestic violence victims is in direct opposition to these public policies. Id.
127. See supra Part III.B (discussing the enactment and scope of the New Ordinance
and how it differs from its predecessor). The ACLU is also asserting that the Old
Ordinance violated Lakisha's constitutional rights, but this assertion is not the subject of
18. Regarding the New Ordinance
this Comment. See Pl.'s First Am. Compl.
challenges, the ACLU asserts standing on the grounds that the New Ordinance continues
to prevent Lakisha from calling the police for protection. See Pl.'s First Am. Compl.
14, 16. Further discussion regarding the issue of standing is outside the scope of this
Comment.
128. P1's First Am. Compl. 216. Whether nuisance laws are unduly vague is an
age-old debate. See John Gray, Public Nuisance: A HistoricalPerspective, NUISANCE
LAW, http://www.nuisancelaw.com/learni/historical (last visited Feb. 13, 2014). Nuisance
laws have been used by governments for centuries to prohibit conduct that, although not
strictly illegal, "was deemed unreasonable in view of its likelihood to injure someone in
the general public." Id. Some lawyers are now seeking to transform nuisance law
jurisprudence by redefining its scope and boundaries. Id. Whether these lawyers will be
successful remains to be seen.
129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that no state shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law"). Under the Due Process Clause,
U.S. citizens are entitled to notice in statutes of what conduct is punishable and what
conduct is not so that they may govern their behavior accordingly. Vagueness Doctrine,
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/vagueness-doctrine
(last visited July 27, 2014).
130. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1814 (9th ed. 2009).
131. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 286 (2008). In a void for
vagueness challenge, a court will presume that the statute at issue is constitutional. See
id. The party challenging the statute has the burden of overturning this presumption. Id.
132. Id.
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law enforcement personnel
cannot arbitrarily and discriminatorily
33
enforce the statute.'
Several hurdles stand in the way of proving that chronic nuisance
ordinances are unconstitutionally vague.
For example, no direct
precedent exists for applying the void for vagueness doctrine to
municipal chronic nuisance ordinances. 134 To further complicate
matters, courts 1have
primarily applied the void for vagueness doctrine in
35
criminal cases.
Some evidence shows, however, that these hurdles can be
overcome. Although the void for vagueness doctrine is primarily used in
criminal cases, some courts have applied the doctrine in civil matters. 136
Furthermore, while the void for vagueness doctrine is mainly used in
civil cases involving the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 3 1 the
U.S. Supreme Court recently held that "[e]ven when speech is not at
'1 38
issue, the void for vagueness doctrine [remains applicable]."
Although chronic nuisance ordinances may be classified as civil
ordinances or civil and criminal ordinances,139 depending on the
jurisdiction, it now seems possible to apply the void for vagueness
doctrine to any municipal chronic nuisance ordinance.
Assuming courts will apply the void for vagueness doctrine to
municipal chronic nuisance ordinances, many chronic nuisance
ordinances will likely fail the first prong of the void for vagueness test.
The first prong examines whether a statute provides citizens with fair
notice of what conduct is prohibited. 140
As previously stated,
Norristown's New Ordinance considers one instance of "disorderly
behavior" to constitute a strike, circuitously defining "disorderly
behavior" as conduct that "involves activity that can be characterized as
disorderly in nature." 141
Likewise, almost all chronic nuisance
ordinances prohibit "disorderly conduct" or contain a similar, seemingly
limitless catch-all provision that can be applied to almost any activity. 142
133. Id.
134. See Eugene Volokh, The Void-for-Vagueness/Fair Notice Doctrine and Civil
Cases, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21, 2012, 12:19 PM), http://bit.ly/lg8J9Ua
[hereinafter Volokh, FairNotice Doctrine].
135. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999). The void for vagueness
doctrine has primarily been applied in criminal cases because the U.S. Supreme Court has
declared that vagueness is especially troublesome within criminal laws. See Reno v. Am.
Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 862, 872 (1997).
136. Volokh, FairNotice Doctrine, supra note 134.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
138. F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012).
139. See Desmond & Valdez, Online Supp., supra note 37, at 4-18.
140. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 286 (2008).
141. Pl.'s First Am. Compl. 132(b).
142. Werth, supra note 4, at 17.
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These limitless catch-all provisions can be construed to encompass
"virtually any call to which the police [respond], including incidents
where the tenant [is] blameless, reasonable in seeking police assistance,
or facing a true emergency, [or] even where the police [respond] to a
baseless call from a vindictive neighbor."143 Because citizens can only
guess as to what conduct is prohibited, such chronic nuisance ordinances
144
fail to provide citizens with fair notice of what is prohibited.
Therefore, the majority of chronic nuisance ordinances likely fail the first
prong of the void for vagueness test.
Chronic nuisance ordinances also likely violate the second prong of
the void for vagueness test. The second prong analyzes whether a statute
provides a standard to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by
law enforcement personnel.1 45 In Norristown's New Ordinance, the
definition of "disorderly behavior" includes as an example "[d]omestic
146
disturbances that do not require that a mandatory arrest be made."
Because this language can be used to describe almost any incident, the
147
police have nearly unfettered discretion in enforcing the ordinance.
The New Ordinance even expressly states that the police have "sole
48
discretion" in determining what conduct is covered by the ordinance.1
Therefore, any conduct, no matter how insignificant or innocent, can be
deemed "disorderly" based on the whims of the responding police
officer. 149 Other chronic nuisance ordinances further empower law
enforcement personnel by creating "buffer zones" that reach conduct that
occurs outside of the tenants' or residents' premises. 150 Therefore, the
lack of a specific, unambiguous standard causes chronic nuisance
151
ordinances to fail the second prong of the void for vagueness test.

7, 14,132(b).
143. Pl.'s First Am. Compl.
144. See id. 1 209, 213.
145. Williams, 553 U.S. at 286.
146. Pl.'s First Am. Compl. % 129, 132(b).
147. See id. 132(a).
148. Id. 1 129 (emphasis added).
149. Id. 1 132(b).
150. See FRANK, supra note 36, at 18-19; see also Part II.A (explaining how some
chronic nuisance ordinances contain "buffer zones").
151. Admittedly, a few jurisdictions have attempted to prevent their police force from
having too much discretion by strictly enforcing their chronic nuisance ordinances. See
FRANK, supra note 36, at 27. When chronic nuisance ordinances are strictly enforced,
law enforcement personnel have no discretion on whether an incident of nuisance activity
should constitute a strike but instead must count every incident as a strike. See id. Strict
enforcement, however, has proved to be unworkable. See id. For example, Cincinnati
attempted to strictly enforce its ordinance until numerous lawsuits forced the city to
abandon its effort and return to discretionary enforcement instead. Id. at 35. Now, most
or perhaps all jurisdictions with chronic nuisance ordinances employ discretionary or
selective enforcement. See id. at 27. Nevertheless, selective enforcement is also flawed
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Because chronic nuisance ordinances appear to fail both prongs of the
void for vagueness test, chronic nuisance ordinances in general are likely
unconstitutionally vague.
B.

Do Chronic Nuisance Ordinances Violate the FourthAmendment
Right Against UnreasonableSeizures?

In Briggs, the ACLU also raises a novel 1 2 argument that the New
Ordinance should be declared unconstitutional because the ordinance
violates Lakisha's right against unreasonable seizures.1 53 The right
54
against unreasonable seizures is derived from the Fourth Amendment, 1
which declares that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable... seizures,
shall not be violated.0 55 Three requirements must be met for evictions
to be considered Fourth Amendment violations.156 The evictions must:
(1) fall under the definition of "seizures," (2) be unreasonable, and (3)
involve government action. 157
Evictions under chronic nuisance ordinances likely fall under the
definition of seizures. A "seizure" is defined as "some meaningful
158
interference with an individual's possessory interests in . . . property.'"
Property interests include leaseholds, which tenants have a right to
possess. 159
Because evictions under chronic nuisance ordinances
interfere with tenants' possessory rights in their
leaseholds, these
60
evictions likely fall under the definition of seizures. 1
Whether evictions under chronic nuisance ordinances involve
government action may be more difficult to prove. Many chronic
nuisance ordinances, like Norristown's New Ordinance, compel
landlords to evict nuisance-causing tenants by imposing a series of
escalating fines each day the tenant remains on the property.161 While
some chronic nuisance ordinances, like Norristown's Old Ordinance,

and leads to law enforcement personnel arbitrarily and discriminatorily applying the
ordinances. Werth, supra note 4, at 17.
152. See Fais, supra note 123, at 1218-19 (failing to list Fourth Amendment
violations in the list of arguments that plaintiffs have previously raised against chronic
nuisance ordinances).
153. Pl.'s First Am. Compl. 173.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
155. Id.
156. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 130 (1984).
157. Id.
158. See id. at 109, 113.
159. See Pl.'s First Am. Compl. 169.
160. Werth, supranote 4, at 4.
161. See Pl.'s First Am. Compl.
172, 178; Desmond & Valdez, Online Supp.,
supra note 37, at 4-18.
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initially order the police to evict tenants, these jurisdictions usually
amend their ordinances to have landlords carry out the evictions after the
municipality is faced with constitutional challenges. 162 The issue, then,
is whether government action is involved when the police do not directly
evict tenants themselves.
Although difficult to prove at first glance, some evidence exists that
the "government action" requirement is satisfied by less than direct
participation by a government agent. For example, in Soldal v. Cook
County, Illinois,163 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a seizure involved
of
government action when police officers simply stood by as employees 164
street.
the
onto
home
mobile
tenant's
a
towed
park
home
mobile
a
The Court held that police ratification of the eviction, even absent direct
participation, remained sufficient to satisfy the government action
requirement. 161 Consequently, it is arguable that no matter who performs
the eviction during the enforcement of a chronic nuisance ordinance,
government action is always involved.
Finally, the unreasonableness requirement is the most difficult to
prove. The Court in Soldal held that "reasonableness is... the ultimate
standard under the Fourth Amendment... [and requires] a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests." 166 Circuits are split as
to what this "careful balancing" entails. 167 Some circuits hold that if
government officials abide by procedural due process requirements then
the government action will always be reasonable. 168 Therefore, in these
jurisdictions, so long as the municipality provides some due .process to
the evicted tenant, the eviction will be reasonable and not in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.
Other circuits, however, hold that an independent review for
reasonableness is required in addition to a procedural due process
analysis. 169 In these jurisdictions, evicted tenants may challenge the lack
of due process given to them as well as the lack of independent
review.1 70 Courts in these circuits will only find a Fourth Amendment
violation, however, when the private interests at issue outweigh the
162.

See, e.g., Pl.'s First Am. Compl.

12-13.

163. Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56 (1992).
at 59.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 62-63.
166. Id. at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Compare Flatford v. City of Monroe, 17 F.3d 162, 170 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding
that, if procedural due process requirements are followed, then the governmental action is
reasonable as a matter of law), with Samuels v. Meriwether, 94 F.3d 1163, 1168 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that an independent review for reasonableness is always required, whether
or not the government fulfilled all due process requirements).
168. See, e.g., Flatford, 17 F.3d at 170.
169. See, e.g., Samuels, 94 F.3d at 1168.
170. See id.
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171
Accordingly, evicted tenants may argue that
government's interests.iV1
their interest in retaining shelter, which the U.S. Supreme Court has held
is "the very core" of the Fourth Amendment, 72 outweighs the
government's interest in abating nuisances. Nevertheless, proponents of
this argument face an uphill battle, as a substantial number of courts have
1 73
upheld the government's interest in abating nuisances in similar cases.
Although evictions under chronic nuisance ordinances appear to fall
under the definition of seizures and fulfill the government action
requirement, the evictions will likely be deemed reasonable. Evictions
under chronic nuisance ordinances, therefore, will likely not be found in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Rather, the void for vagueness
doctrine is the strongest argument for tenants seeking to raise
constitutional challenges against chronic nuisance ordinances.

V.

RECOMMENDATION TO MUNICIPALITIES

Municipalities be forewarned: chronic nuisance ordinances should
be avoided. 174 Such ordinances will likely be found unconstitutional in
the future, and the ordinances have proven to be unpopular with both
tenants and landlords, resulting in a plague of lawsuits against the
municipalities that adopt such ordinances. 75 Because of the inevitable
onslaught of litigation, some municipalities have refrained from adopting
chronic nuisance ordinances, 7 6 choosing instead to implement other

171. See id.
172. Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992).
173. See Samuels, 94 F.3d at 1168 (holding that the city's destruction of an apartment
building for failing to abate nuisances was reasonable); Freeman v. City of Dallas, 242
F.3d 642, 654 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the city's destruction of vacant apartment
buildings due to label of "urban nuisances" was reasonable); Hedrick v. Pfeiffer, 10 F.
Supp. 2d 1106, 1112 (D. Neb. 1998) (holding that city's placement of locks and hasps on
rental property due to owner's failure to abate nuisance was reasonable), aff'd, 175 F.3d
1024 (8th Cir. 1999).
174. See Johnny Edwards, Officials Chided on Nuisance Issue, THE AUGUSTA
CHRONICLE, May 20, 2010, available at http://m.chronicle.augusta.com/latest-news/201005-20/officials-chided-nuisance-issue#gsc.tab=0.
175. See id. For example, Cincinnati, Ohio, has faced numerous lawsuits since
enacting its chronic nuisance ordinance in 2006, resulting in multiple changes to the
ordinance and a giant headache for the municipality. See Kevin LeMaster, Chronic
Nuisance Ordinance to be Reviewed.

..

Again, BUILDING CINCINNATI (Apr. 13, 2010),

http://www.building-cincinnati.com/2010/04/chronic-nuisance-ordinance-to-be.html.
176. See Edwards, supra note 174. Susan Moore, the General Counsel of Augusta,
Georgia, actively discouraged her municipality from adopting a chronic nuisance
ordinance, stating "I believe that adoption and enforcement of [a chronic nuisance]
ordinance would result in expensive, drawn-out litigation much like Cincinnati has
experienced." Id.
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methods of controlling nuisance activity. 177 For the municipalities that
choose to adopt chronic nuisance ordinances, expensive, drawn-out
litigation awaits them. 171
Other reasons also exist for avoiding chronic nuisance ordinances.
At this time, the long-term effects a chronic nuisance ordinance may
have on a community are unknown. 179 Whether chronic nuisance
ordinances are effective at ending nuisance activities 18 or simply move
the activities from one region to another is also unknown.' 81 Finally,
chronic nuisance ordinances should be avoided because82 of the
detrimental impact they have on victims of domestic violence. 1
If a municipality insists on adopting a chronic nuisance ordinance,
the municipality should take steps to ensure that it protects domestic
violence victims as much as possible. 183 The protection of domestic
violence victims may be accomplished through several measures.
Foremost, any vague, limitless catch-all provision that may be used to
encompass acts of domestic violence must be removed. Additionally,
language must be inserted into the ordinance that creates an exception for
victims of domestic violence. 184 Some municipalities, for example, are
considering adding language to their chronic nuisance ordinance that
states that only the perpetrators of crimes and nuisance activities, and
not the victims of those crimes and activities, may have the ordinance
enforced against them.18 These same municipalities are also considering
adopting a policy of imposing a strike upon citizens only if either: "1)
[they have] been convicted of an offense[] [and] 2) there is evidence
beyond the mere fact of arrest or citation that corroborates that nuisance
activity actually occurred."' 186 These measures in turn will more clearly
provide citizens with fair notice of what conduct is prohibited and

177. See id. For example, municipalities have created multidisciplinary task forces
whose objective is to reduce nuisance activities as another method of controlling nuisance
activity. See id.
178. See Fais, supra note 123, at 1205.
179. See supra Part I.B.
180. See supra Part II.B (explaining how chronic nuisance ordinances may in fact
cause harm to communities).
181. See supra Part II.B.
182. See supraPart II.C.
183. Protecting domestic violence victims will also protect the municipality from
excessive lawsuits, as domestic violence victims are a significant source of the lawsuits
plaguing municipalities. See Grape v. Town/Village of East Rochester, No. 07-CV-6075CJS-(F) (W.D.N.Y. July 6, 2007); Briggs v. Borough of Norristown, No. 2:13-cv-02191ER (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 29, 2013).
184. See Letter from Shriver Center to Rockford, Ill. City Council (Jan. 15, 2013),
http://bit.ly/lj6p4gZ [hereinafter Shriver Letter].
185. See id.
186. Id.
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prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance,
87
protecting the municipality from void for vagueness challenges. 1
While adding an exception for domestic violence victims is a start,
more is needed to protect them. In many instances, an act of domestic
violence can be categorized as another type of nuisance activity, such as
an assault or instance of fighting, harassment, public noise disturbance,
and so on. 188 Consequently, police education and training is needed to
identify domestic violence situations. 189 Once a domestic violence
situation is identified, police should refrain from charging a domestic
violence victim with a strike for any type of nuisance activity, no matter
Furthermore, if a strike is
how the activity is characterized. 190
mistakenly imposed for a domestic violence incident, no penalty should
be imposed upon the property owner for not evicting a domestic violence
victim. 191
Finally, if a municipality insists on enacting a chronic nuisance
ordinance, the municipality should ensure that landlords, not the police,
perform evictions under the ordinance. Although indirect government
action is sufficient for a Fourth Amendment seizure to occur, 192 the
government action involved is less obvious. Even though courts will
likely hold that evictions under chronic nuisance ordinances do not
violate the Fourth Amendment no matter who performs the evictions,193
Fourth Amendment challenges are less likely to be raised when landlords
perform the evictions. When fewer Fourth Amendment challenges are
raised, municipalities save significant expenses that otherwise would be
spent on protracted litigation. 194
These measures will limit the harmful effects that chronic nuisance
ordinances cause domestic violence victims and municipalities.
Complications and unforeseen ramifications, however, will doubtless
develop no matter how a municipality drafts its ordinance. Therefore,
municipalities should seriously consider implementing alternative
measures to control nuisance activities. A chronic nuisance ordinance is
a hasty remedy, not a "panacea for [all] ... ailments" conflicting a
municipality. 19
187. See supra Part IV.A (arguing that chronic nuisance ordinances violate the void
for vagueness doctrine).
188. See Shriver Letter, supra note 184.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See supra Part IV.B.
193. See supra Part JV.B.
194. See supra note 183 (stating that lawsuits plague municipalities that have enacted
chronic nuisance ordinances, which results in significant costs for municipalities).
195. FRANK, supra note 36, at i.
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CONCLUSION

Chronic nuisance ordinances treat acts of domestic violence as
"nuisances" instead of crimes. As chronic nuisance ordinances continue
to grow in popularity, the same frightening decision Lakisha Briggs
faced is being forced on more and more victims of domestic violence:
call the police and face forced homelessness or continue to be abused.
Consequently, the constitutionality of these ordinances will continue to
be questioned in upcoming years, and whether the ordinances will
survive these attacks remains to be seen.
In the meantime, municipalities should at the very least implement
measures to limit the ordinances' harmful effects. Ideally, however,
municipalities should avoid chronic nuisance ordinances entirely.
Domestic violence victims should not be blamed for failing to control
their abusers. It is time to stop treating domestic violence like a nuisance
and to start treating it like the crime that it is.

